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 WERE  THERE  REGIME  SWITCHES  IN  U.S.  MONETARY  POLICY?
I.  THE  DEBATE  OVER MONETARY POLICY CHANGE
In  an  inﬂuential  paper,  Clarida,  Galí  and  Gertler  2000  (CGG)  presented  evidence  that
US monetary policy changed between the 1970’s and the 1980’s, indeed that in the 70’s
it was drastically worse. They found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70’s
was one that, when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models, would imply
non-uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to “sunspot”
ﬂuctuations of arbitrarily large size. Their estimated policy rule for the later period, on the
other hand, eliminated this indeterminacy. These results are a possible explanation of the
volatile and rising inﬂation of the 70’s and of its subsequent decline.REGIME SWITCHES 2
The CGG analysis has two important weaknesses. One is that it fails to account for
stochastic volatility. US macroeconomic variables, and particularly the federal funds rate,
have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation, with forecast error variances
varying greatly from period to period. Ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent
estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant, but
it strongly biases — toward a ﬁnding of changed parameters — tests of the stability of the
forecasting equations.
The other weakness is that the CGG analysis rests on powerful and implausible identify-
ing assumptions. They require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority
to expected future inﬂation and output does not depend on the recent history of inﬂation,
money growth, or output. It is hard to understand why this should be so, especially in the
70’s, when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates, Congress was requiring
reports from the Fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates, and ﬁnancial markets
were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers. The requirement for existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a
more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that
appear on the right-hand side of the reaction function. If we force a particular measure of
expected future inﬂation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear inde-
pendently in the reaction function, we are bound to get distorted conclusions. On the one
hand, because expected future inﬂation will be a “noisy” measure of the full set of nominal
inﬂuences on policy, we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errors-
in-variables effect. On the other hand, to the extent that expected future inﬂation (like most
expected future values) shows less variation than current nominal variables, we could ﬁnd
a mistaken scaling up of coefﬁcients.
It should not be surprising that the CGG approach is fragile. For one thing, most equi-
librium models contain something like the Fisher equation, relating the nominal rate toREGIME SWITCHES 3
expected inﬂation and the real rate. The usual sort of discussion of whether instrumental
variables are uncorrelated with disturbances does not confront the question of what creates
a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the “forward-looking Taylor rule” equation
relating expected future inﬂation and a real variable to the current nominal rate and, on the
other hand, the “Fisher equation” that also relates expected future inﬂation and a real vari-
able to the current nominal rate. Indeed in some simple models the real rate is determined
by expected future output growth, which might be a candidate as the expected real variable
on the right-hand side variable of a forward-lookingTaylor rule. If the distinction between
these equations is statistically weak, no amount of testing of overidentifying restrictions
will detect the problem — both equations will satisfy all the exclusion restrictions.
If the actual policy rule is at least partly backward-looking, the CGG identifying restric-
tions can produce very misleading results. For example, it is plausible that when monetary
policy raises the interest rate, it tends to bring down inﬂation, with a delay. In other words,
we can easily imagine an economy in which, when we observe high interest rates, we con-
clude that monetary policy is tight and that therefore inﬂation will soon be low. This would
certainly not imply that monetary policy is allowing non-uniqueness of equilibrium, but
it would imply that the partial correlation of current interest rates with future inﬂation is
negative. And of course a small component of this effect, combined with the Fisher rela-
tion, could easily produce a positive partial correlation but a CGG coefﬁcient on expected
inﬂation less than one.
A simple example of a New Keynesian model with a unique equilibrium, but in which
the CGG methods would produce misleading results, appears in Appendix A.
Bernankeand Mihov (1998)made their identifyingassumptions explicit in a multivariate
model, and they concluded that there was little evidence of major shifts in monetary policy.
Like the rest of the structural VAR literature, (and unlike users of the single-equation CGG
setup) they validate their identifyingassumptions by displaying impulse response functions
that let us assess whether their estimates imply plausible policy effects in a full dynamic
system. They did not model time-varying volatility, however.REGIME SWITCHES 4
Cogley and Sargent (2002) apply the CGG identifying assumptions in the context of a
model with stochastically drifting parameters and stochastic volatility. Though they em-
phasize that their results are consistent with their own earlier work that ignored stochastic
volatility and found important changes in policy parameters, after accounting for stochastic
volatility their results are also largely consistent with the hypothesis that there has been no
drift at all in the parameters of the policy rule. This latter result is in sharp contrast with
their earlier work that ignored stochastic volatility. It is disappointing that, despite having
an estimated multivariate model available, they did not check whether their identifying as-
sumptions are consistent with plausible impulse response to monetary policy disturbances.
Boivinand Giannoni(2003)test forstructuralchange in a VAR model and ﬁndstrong ev-
idence of a change using an asymptotically justiﬁed hypothesis test. They do not include a
monetary aggregate in their system. They describe the test they use as “heteroskedasticity-
consistent”, but it allows for changing variances in only a limited sense. It accounts for
ﬂuctuatingdisturbance variance that can be explained by right-hand-sidevariables(through
use of heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators) and it also allows for a
single change in residual variances somewhere in the sample (not necessarily synchronized
with the break in coefﬁcient values that is being tested for). Eyeball inspection of forecast
errors for short interest rates before, during, and after the 1979-82 period makes it evident
that a single shift in variance will not capture the actual historical experience, and it is hard
to argue that the period of increased variance in interest rate disturbances was predictable
fromright-hand-sidevariablesin a VAR. The conclusion in this Boivin-Giannonipaper that
there is coefﬁcient change therefore reﬂects the same sort of bias as do other papers that do
not make realistic allowance for changing disturbance variances.
Boivin (2004) is a single-equation study using a version of the CGG identiﬁcation as-
sumptions. It ﬁnds evidence of coefﬁcient change, using a test statistic with the same
weaknesses as that in Boivin and Giannoni (2003). Its estimated time patterns of changes
in the policy rule do agree qualitatively with the ﬁndings of this paper, though, in that it
ﬁnds large changes that are later reversed, rather than a monotonic evolution.
Primiceri(2003b,a) studies changes in monetarypolicy in twopapers. In one he provides
a tightly parameterized model that he uses to interpret the historical record as reﬂectingREGIME SWITCHES 5
learning by monetary policy makers about the structure of the economy. In the other he
models time variation along lines similar to Cogley and Sargent, but with more complete
and explicit treatment of identiﬁcation. In the latter paper he concludes that there has
been time variation in US monetary policy, but that it has not been of great quantitative
importance. The paper on learning appears in conﬂict with the other paper, since it argues
that the rise and fall in US inﬂation can be explained by policy-makers’ learning. The
conﬂict is not necessarily strong, however. The work of Cogley and Sargent and Primiceri
all ﬁts with the notion that the data do not deliver clear evidence of parameterchange unless
one imposes strong, and potentially controversial, overidentifying assumptions — which is
exactly what Primiceri does in his learning paper.
This paper follows Primiceri in using a multivariate model with stochastic volatility and
explicit identifying assumptions that allow us to consider monetary policy change. Unlike
Primiceri, we model parameter change as discrete, discontinuous, stochastically timed,
changes in parameters and variances. The type of model we use is known as a “Markov
switching” or “hidden Markovchain” model. This approach seems well suited to the period
we study, because the “Volcker reserves targeting” period, October 1979 through 1982, is
widely recognized to have constituted a sudden shift to a new pattern of policy behavior.
The models used by Primiceriand Cogley and Sargentimplya morenearly continuoustime
path for parameters and therefore do not track well around the October 1979 date. Also, the
Markov switching framework includes as a limiting case a model of fat-tailed distributions
for disturbances, treated as mixtures of normal random variables with different variances.
Finally, thetheoreticalrationalexpectations monetarypolicy literaturehas oftenarguedthat
the only important policy changes are “regime shifts”, which are modeled as once-and-for-
all discontinuous changes. It is thereforeof some interest to use a modeling frameworkthat
could detect such regime shifts if they did occur historically in US data.
Our conclusions have two levels. The most important result is simple: the version of
our model that ﬁts best is one that shows no change at all in coefﬁcients either of the
policy rule or of the private sector block of the model. What changes across “regimes” is
only the variances of structural disturbances. The Volcker reserves targeting period then
emerges simply as a period of high variance in disturbances of the policy rule. However,REGIME SWITCHES 6
like Cogley and Sargent and Primiceri, we ﬁnd that if we do allow coefﬁcients to change,
the point estimates of the changes are not substantively trivial, even though the data leave
their magnitudes uncertain.
So a second level of our analysis explores the best-ﬁtting model we have found that
does allow change in parameters other than structural equation variances. That model is
one that allows the strength of monetary policy responses to vary with the regime, but
with other parameters remaining ﬁxed, except for equation variances. The model ﬁnds
the best ﬁt with four regimes. One occurs in only a few brief spans of months, one of
which is September-October 2001, and has very high residual variance in money demand.
Anothercorresponds to the Volckerreserve-targetingperiodand shows clearly the targeting
of monetary aggregates, rather than interest rates, in that regime. Another regime has been
in place through nearly all of the years of the Greenspan Fed chairmanship — but also was
in place through most of the 60’s. A third regime occurred in several multi-year episodes
in the late 60’s and early 70’s. Though it does not show as strong a monetary-aggregate-
targeting ﬂavor as the Volcker regime, it does tend much more strongly in that direction
than the “Greenspan” regime. We call this third regime the “Burns” regime, even though
the “Greenspan” regime was in place though approximately the same proportion of the
Burns chairmanship as was the “Burns” regime. (For most of this paper we drop the quotes
on the regime names, hoping the reader can bear in mind that the correspondence of the
regimes to chairmanship terms is rough.) For all of the three regimes our estimates imply
that with high probability monetary policy responses to inﬂation were strong enough to
guarantee a determinate equilibrium price level.
We display counterfactualsimulations of history with alternate monetarypolicy regimes.
Any one of the three main regimes could have been held in place, we conclude, and the
pattern of rising inﬂation in the 70’s, followed by decline in the 80’s, would with high
probability have been maintained. The steepness of the rise and of the fall in inﬂation
would have been different under different regimes, as would the depth of recessions that
occurred along the way.
The model implies that Greenspan’s monetary policy, had it been in place through the
70’s, would have resulted in a less steep rise in inﬂation than actually occurred — butREGIME SWITCHES 7
that it would have done so without (with high probability) at any point pushing interest
rates higher. Apparently the model’s dynamics imply that the harsher stop-go pattern of
actual monetary policy in the 70’s, with deeper recessions and very rapid expansions on
emergence from recession, was more responsible for the rise in inﬂation than was any
general tendency to keep interest rates low.
We think these empirical results have important implications for future research on the-
oretical models with more detailed behavioral structure.
• The Taylor rule formalism, valuable as it may be as a way to characterize policy in
the last 20 years, can be seriously misleading if we try to use it to interpret other
historical periods, where monetary aggregate growth was an important factor in the
thinking of policy-makers.
• We should look for structural modeling ideas that might match the observation that
stop-go policies can generate rising inﬂation even with high average interest rates.
• It is time to abandon the idea that policy change is best modeled as a once-and-for-
all, non-stochastic regime switch. Policy changes, if they have occurred, have not
been monotonic, and they have been difﬁcult to detect. Both the rational public in
our models and econometricians must treat the changes in policy probabilistically,
with a model of how and when the policy shifts occur and with recognition of the
uncertainty about their nature and timing.
II. CLASS OF MODELS
The general frameworkis described by nonlinear stochastic dynamic simultaneous equa-




t, t = 1,...,T, (1)
Pr(st = i | st−1 = k)=pik, i,k = 1,...,h, (2)
where s is an unobserved state, y is an n×1 vector of endogenous variables, x is an m×1
vector of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, A0 is an n×n matrix of parameters,
A+ is an m×n matrix of parameters, T is a sample size, and h is the total number of states.REGIME SWITCHES 8
Denote the longest lag length in the system of equations (1) by ν . The vector of right-
hand variables, xt, is ordered from the n endogenous variables for the ﬁrst lag down to the
n variables for the last (ν th) lag with the last element of xt being the constant term.
For t = 1,...,T, denote
Yt = {y1,...,yt}.
We treat as given the initial lagged values of endogenous variables Y0 = {y1−ν ,...,y0}.
Structural disturbances are assumed to have the distribution:







where N(a,b) refers to the normal pdf with mean a and covariance matrix b and In is an
n×n identity matrix. Following Hamilton 1989 and Chib 1996, we impose no restrictions
on the transition matrix P =[pik]. 1
The reduced-form system of equations implied by (1) is:
y 
t = x 
t B(st)+u 
t(st), t = 1,...,T; (3)
1As showninSimsandZha2004,theclassofmultipleequationmodelsconsideredinthispaperiscomplex
and pushes the limits of what our computers and analytical capacity can handle. One could in principle (and
we intend to do so in future work) give special structure to P to investigate a variety of models of parameter
change. For example, one could create twoclasses of state variable, one indexing variances and one indexing
equation coefﬁcients. These could be allowed to evolve independently. If the transition matrices for the two
types of state are Q1 and Q2, we get the desired independentevolutionby settingP =Q1⊗Q2. We couldalso
postulate an s that takes on many values, but with the values interpreted as subsets of the plane over which
the joint distribution of xt and xt−1 from an autoregressive model are spread. P’s entries are then ﬁlled in
as the conditional probabilities of these subsets of the plane. This would allow us to have a large P whose
entries are functions of a small number of parameters, and to approximate arbitrarilywell the kindof smooth
drift in parameters assumed by Cogley and Sargent and by Primiceri. But in this framework we could easily
allow for occasional discontinuous jumps as well as smoother drift. Moreover, a restriction that parameter
change is monotonic, with no state recurring after it has been exited, can be implemented by requiringthat P











In the reduced form (4)-(6), B(st) and ut(st) involve the structural parameters and shocks
across equations, making it impossible to distinguish regime shifts from one structural
equationto another. In contrast, thestructuralform(1)allowsone toidentifyeach structural
equation, such as the policy rule, for regime switches.
If we let all parameters vary across states, it is relatively straightforward to apply the
existing methods of Chib 1996 and Sims and Zha 1998a to the model estimation because
A0(st) and A+(st) in each given state can be estimated independent of the parameters in
other states. But with such an unrestricted form for the time variation, if the system of
equations is large or the lag length is long, the number of free parameters in the model
becomes impractically large. For a typical monthly model with 13 lags and 6 endogenous
variables, for example, the number of parameters in A+(st) is of order 468 for each state.
Given the post-war macroeconomic data, however, it is not uncommon to have some states
lasting for only a few years and thus the number of associated observations is far less than
468. Itis thereforeessential tosimplify the modelby restricting the degree oftime variation
in the model’s parameters.



















If we place a prior distribution on D(st) that has mean zero, our prior is centered on the
same reduced-form random walk model that is the prior mean in existing Bayesian VAR
models (Sims and Zha 1998a). As can be seen from (4)-(7), this form of prior implies that
smaller A−1
0 values, and thus smaller reduced form residual variances, are associated withREGIME SWITCHES 10
tighter concentration of the prior about the random walk form of the reduced form. On
the other hand, small values of D are also associated with tighter concentration of the prior
about the random walk reduced form, without any corresponding effect on reduced form
residual variances.
We consider the following three cases of restricted time variations for A0(st) and D(st):
a0,j(st),dij, (st),cj(st)=

    
    
¯ a0,j, ¯ dij, , ¯ cj Case I
¯ a0,jξ j(st), ¯ dij, ξ j(st), ¯ cjξ j(st) Case II
a0,j(st), ¯ dij, λ ij(st),cj(st) Case III
, (8)
where ξ j(st) is a scale factor for the jth structural equation, a0,j(st) is the jth column of
A0(st), dj(st) is the jth column of D(st), dij, (st) is the element of dj(st) for the ith variable
at the  th lag, the last element of dj(st), cj(st), is the constant term for equation j. The
parameter λ ij(st) changes with variables but does not vary across lags. This allows long
run responses to vary over time, while constraining the dynamic form of the responses
to vary only through λ ii, which can be though of as indexing the degree of inertia in the
variable interpreted as the “left-hand side”. Of course in this simultaneous equations setup,
there may not be a variable that is uniquely appropriate as “left-hand side” in equation i.
The speciﬁcation insures, though, that whichever variable we think of as on the left hand
side, the time variation in dynamics is one-dimensional, in that it affects all “right-hand
side” variables in the same way. The bar symbol over a0,j, dij, , and cj means that these
parameters are state-independent (i.e., constant across time).
Case I is a constant-coefﬁcient structural equation. Case II is an equation with time-
varying disturbance variances only. Case III is an equation with time-varying coefﬁcients,
as well as time varying disturbance variances.
We have considered models with Case II speciﬁcations for all equations, with Case II
for the policy equation and Case III for all others, with Case III for the policy equation
and Case II for all others, and with Case III for all equations. That is, we have examined
modelswithtimevariationincoefﬁcientsinallequations, withtimevariationin coefﬁcients
in policy or private sector equations only, and with no time variation in coefﬁcients. In allREGIME SWITCHES 11
of these cases we allow time variation in structural disturbance variances of all equations.
The model with time variation in coefﬁcents in all equations might be expected to ﬁt best
if there were policy regime changes and the nonlinear effects of these changes on private
sector dynamics, via changes in private sector forecasting behavior, were important. That
this is possible was the main point of Lucas Jr. (1972).
However, as one of us has explained at more length elsewhere (Sims, 1987), once we
recognize that changes in policy must in principle themselves be modeled as stochastic,
Lucas’s argument can be seen as a claim that a certain sort of nonlinearity is important.
Even if the public believes that policy is time-varying and tries to adjust its expectation-
formation accordingly, its behavior could be well approximated as linear and non-time-
varying. As with any use of a linear approximation, it is an empirical matter whether the
linear approximation is adequate for a particular sample or counterfactual analysis.2
We consider the model with Case III for all equations because we are interested in
whether it ﬁts better than the other models, as would be true if policy had changed within
the sample and Lucas-critique nonlinearities were important. We consider the other combi-
nations because it is possible that coefﬁcients in the policy have not changed enough for the
changes to emerge clearly from the data, or enough to generate detectable corresponding
changes in private sector behavior.
III. DATA,I DENTIFICATION, AND MODEL FIT
We use monthly US data from 1959:1–2003:3. Each model has 13 lags and includes
the constant term and 6 commonly-used endogenous variables: a commodity price index
(Pcom), M2 divisia (M), the federal funds rate (R), interpolated monthly real GDP (y), the
core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index (P), and the unemployment rate
(U). All variables are expressed in natural logs except for the federal funds rate and the
unemployment rate which are expressed in percent.3
2Another early paper emphasizing the need for stochastic modeling of policy change is Cooley, LeRoy,
and Raymon (1984). More recently Leeper and Zha 2003 have drawn out the implications of this way of
thinkingfor the practice of monetary policy.
3As robustness checks, we also used the M2 stock instead of M2 divisia and the CPI (as well as the GDP
deﬂator) instead of the core PCE price index and the paper’s main conclusions remained unchanged.REGIME SWITCHES 12
TABLE 1. Identifying restrictions on A0(st)
Variable (below) Sector (right) Inf Fed MD Prod Prod Prod
Pcom X
M X X X
R X X X
y X X X X X
P X X X X
U X X
The identiﬁcation of monetary policy, following Leeper and Zha 2003, is described in
Table 1. The X’s in Table 1 indicate the unrestricted parameters in A0(st) and the blank
spaces indicate the parameters that are restricted to be zero. The “Fed” column in Table 1
represents the Federal Reserve contemporaneous behavior; the “Inf” column describes the
informationsector (the commodity market);the “MD” represents the money demand equa-
tion; and the block consisting of the last three columns represents the production sector,
whose variables are arbitrarily ordered in an upper triangular form.4
In addition to the exact zero restrictions shown in Table 1, we introduce stochastic prior
information favoring a negative contemporaneous response of money demand to the inter-
est rate and a positive contemporaneous response of the interest rate to money (see Ap-
pendix B). More precisely, we use a prior that makes the coefﬁcients on R and M in the
money demand column of A0 positively correlated and in the monetary policy column of
A0 negatively correlated. This liquidity effect prior has little inﬂuence on the correlation of
posterior estimates of the coefﬁcients in the policy and the money demand equations, but
4While we provide no discussion here of why delays in reaction of the private sector to ﬁnancial variables
might be plausible, explanations of inertia, and examination of its effects, are common in the recent literature
(e.g., Christiano,Eichenbaum, and Evans 2001, Edge 2000, Sims 2003;1998). The economic and theoretical
justiﬁcation of the identiﬁcation presented in Table 1 can also be found in Leeper, Sims, and Zha 1996 and
Sims and Zha 1998b. This identiﬁcation has proven to be stable across different sets of variables, different
sample periods, and different developed economies.REGIME SWITCHES 13
it makes point estimates of coefﬁcienta and impulse responses more stable across different
sample periods.
We compare ﬁve types of models
Constant: a constant-parameter BVAR (i.e., all equations are Case I);
Variances Only: all equations are Case II;
Monetary Policy: all equations except the monetary policy rule are Case II, while
the policy rule is Case III;
Private Sector: equations in the private sector are Case III and monetary policy is
Case II;
All Change: all equations are Case III.
There are two major factors that make the estimation and inference of our models a
difﬁcult task. One factor is simultaneous relationships in the structural coefﬁcient matrix
A0(st). The other factor is the types of restricted time variations speciﬁed in (8). Without
these elements, the shape of the posterior density would be much more regular and more
straightforward Gibbs sampling methods would apply. Appendix B outlines the methods
and brieﬂy discusses both analytical and computational difﬁculties.
The ﬁrst set of results to consider is measures of model ﬁt, with the comparison based
on posterior marginal data densities. The results are displayed in Table 2. For the models
with larger numbers of free parameters we were unable to obtain convergence when the
number of states became too large and label these situations by “DEG.”5 Note that this
is a log-likelihood scale, so that differences of 1 or 2 in absolute value mean little, while
differences of 10 or more imply extreme odds ratios in favor of the higher-marginal-data-
density model. For the upper rows in the table the Monte Carlo error in these numbers
(based on two million MCMC draws) is from ±2t o±4. For the lower boundary in each
column the error is larger. These estimates of MCMC error are conservative, based on
our own experience with multiple starting points for the chain. Conventional measures
5DEG stands for “degenerate.” Models with large number of parameters overﬁt to the data and conse-
quently some states become redundant. These states are not drawn at all in our Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulations. In some cases, such degenerate draws led to much lower values of log likelihoodbut
these values can ﬂuctuate wildly from one sequence of MCMC draws to another.REGIME SWITCHES 14
TABLE 2. Comprehensive measures of ﬁt
Log marginal data densities
Constant 12,998.20
Variances Only Monetary Policy Private Sector All Change
2 states 13,345.71 13,383.36 13,280.74 13308.80
3 states 13,434.25 13,446.13 13,380.77 13426.78
4 states 13,466.86 13,480.18 DEG DEG
5 states 13,455.26 13,400.10 DEG DEG
6 states 13,510.31 DEG DEG DEG
7 states 13,530.71 DEG DEG DEG
8 states 13,540.32 DEG DEG DEG
9 states 13,544.07 DEG DEG DEG
10 states 13,538.03 DEG DEG DEG
of accuracy based on serial covariances of the draws, for example, would suggest much
smaller error bands.
When the whole private sector, or the whole model, is allowed to change according to
Case III,the marginaldata density is distinctly lowerthan that ofthe best models fora given
rowof the table and for those versions ofthe model for which we could obtainconvergence.
The best ﬁt is for the 9-state variances-only model, though any of the 7 through 10 state
versions of that model have similar ﬁt. The marginal data density for these variances-only
models are higher by at least 50 on a log scale than that for any other model. The best
of the models allowing time variation in coefﬁcients is the monetary policy model with 4
states, whose marginal data density is higher by at least 50 than that of any other model
that allows change in coefﬁcients.6
6Note, though, that because models with too many parameters are clearly paying a penalty here, it may
be that the “private sector” and “all change” models may be doing less well because of parameter count. It
could be that more tightlyparameterized models of coefﬁcient change in the private sector wouldlook better
in a table like this.REGIME SWITCHES 15
TABLE 3. Transition matrix for 9-state variances-only model
0.9643 0.0063 0.0117 0.0064 0.0108
0.0030 0.9394 0.0047 0.0070 0.0210
0.0104 0.0159 0.9455 0.0064 0.0046
0.0026 0.0043 0.0042 0.9476 0.0040
0.0058 0.0155 0.0044 0.0068 0.9425
0.0027 0.0056 0.0058 0.0064 0.0051
0.0052 0.0042 0.0081 0.0068 0.0040
0.0033 0.0041 0.0069 0.0062 0.0038
0.0026 0.0046 0.0087 0.0065 0.0042
0.0057 0.0107 0.0095 0.0049
0.0062 0.0061 0.0069 0.0112
0.0063 0.0064 0.0096 0.0057
0.0058 0.0056 0.0062 0.0051
0.0185 0.0058 0.0064 0.0057
0.9406 0.0120 0.0062 0.0050
0.0057 0.9423 0.0062 0.0053
0.0056 0.0054 0.9429 0.0049
0.0056 0.0056 0.0062 0.9522
IV. BEST-FIT MODEL
There are a number of best-ﬁt models, all of them variances-only models with from 7 to
10 states. Since the results from these models are quite similar, we report the results from
only the 9-state variances-only model. The transition matrix for the 9 states is shown in
Table 3. The states appear to behave similarly, and they have a fairly evenly spread set of
steady-state probabilities, ranging from .078 to .19.REGIME SWITCHES 16
TABLE 4. Relative shock standard deviations across states for 9-state
variances-only model
Financial M Policy M demand Private y Private P Private U
First state 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Second state 0.95 1.47 1.03 2.07 1.19 1.69
Third state 1.28 1.65 1.84 1.11 1.12 0.91
Fourth state 2.01 2.65 1.93 1.59 1.29 1.37
Fifth state 1.38 2.95 1.24 1.01 0.96 1.17
Sixth state 2.67 2.99 2.32 2.52 0.95 2.13
Seventh state 2.40 4.43 1.21 1.59 2.58 1.05
Eighth state 2.55 4.49 11.44 4.10 10.48 2.67
Ninth state 1.49 12.57 1.53 1.44 1.48 1.44
The 1st state is used as a benchmark with its variances being normalized to 1. As can
be seen from Figure 1, this state prevails in most of the Greenspan regime and includes
several years in the 1960s. The variances in other states do not simply scale up and down
across all structural equations. Some states affect a group of structural shocks jointly, as
can be seen from Table 4. The 9th state prevails in the Volcker reserve-targeting period,
and primarily inﬂates the variance of the policy shock (Figure 1 and Table 4.) The 8th
state inﬂates the variances of several private-sector equations, and it prevails only for the
two months of September and October, 2001. This is clearly a “9/11” state. The other
states exist sporadically over the 70’s as well as over the period from 1983 to 1987 and
some years in the 60’s. Among these states, the shock variances change irregularly from
state to state. For the 70’s, short-lived states with changing shock variances reﬂect several
economic disruptions (e.g., two big oil shocks) and the ambivalent way monetary policy
was conducted in response to those disturbances.
For this variances-only model, the structural parameters and impulse responses vary
across states only up to scales. Table 5 reports the estimate of contemporaneous coefﬁ-
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FIGURE 1. 9-state variances-only probabilities; the Fed Funds Rate in up-
per left.REGIME SWITCHES 18
shows a much larger contemporaneous coefﬁcient on R than on M, implying the Federal
Reserve pays much more attention to the interest rate than the money stock in response to
the economic development.
Estimates of the model’s dynamic responses are very similar to those produced by pre-
vious identiﬁed VAR models, so we will not present a full set of impulse responses. The
results are as sensible as for previous models, yet we have a more accurate picture of uncer-
tainty because of its stochastically evolving shock variances. The responses to a monetary
policy shock for the 1st state, together with error bands, are shown in Figure 2.7 Note
that, though commodity prices and the money stock decline following a shock that tightens
monetary policy, the point estimates show P declining only after a delay of serveral years,
and this decline is small and uncertain.
Table 6 reports artiﬁcial long run responses of the policy rate to other macro variables,
as often presented in the literature. By “artiﬁcial” we mean that these are neither an equi-
librium outcome nor multivariate impulse responses, but are calculated from the policy
reaction function alone, asking what would be the permanent response in R to a perma-
nent increase in the level or rate of change of the variable in question, if all other variables
remained constant. The long run response to the level of the variable is calculated as
∑
ν
 =0α  /∑
ν
 =0δ  , where α   is the coefﬁcient on the  th lag of the “right-hand-side” variable
and δ   is the coefﬁcient on the  th lag of the “left-hand-side” variable in the policy rule.






 =0δ  .
In Table 6, the differenced (log) variables such as ∆ y and ∆ P are annualized to match the
annual rate of interest R. Absence of sunspots in the price level will be associated with the
sum of these long run responses to nominal variables (here ∆ PCom, ∆ M, and ∆ P) exceed-
ing 1. For this model the sum is 1.76, well above one, though the error bands on individual
coefﬁcient leave room for some uncertainty.
V. POLICY REGIME SWITCHES
In this section, we present the key results from the 4-state model with time-varying
coefﬁcients in the policy rule. There are two reasons why this model may be of interest,
















































































































































































FIGURE 2. Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock, 9-state Variances-Only Model
Note: Each graph shows, over 48 months, the modal’s estimated response (blackest), the median response,
and 68% and 90% probabilitybands.REGIME SWITCHES 20
TABLE 5. Contemporaneous coefﬁcient matrix for 9-state variances-only model
Financial M Policy M demand Private y Private P Private U
Pcom 70.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M 9.21 −130.24 −669.91 0.00 0.00 0.00
R −27.30 688.52 −70.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
y −14.21 0.00 19.85 308.75 −20.77 51.94
P −5.54 −0.00 216.07 0.00 −1061.30 32.38
U 82.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 766.38
TABLE 6. Long run policy responses in 9-state variances-only model
Responses of R to Posterior peak estimate .68 probability interval
∆ Pcom 0.21 (0.17, 0.73)
∆ M 0.16 (-0.48, 0.44)
∆ y 0.71 ( 0.69, 3.36)
∆ P 1.39 ( 0.45, 2.21)
U -1.01 (-2.80, -0.42)
despite the fact that it is dominated in ﬁt by the model with only disturbance variances
changing. First, this model’s ﬁt is substantially better than all other models that allow
change in coefﬁcients (Table 2). Second, the model reﬂects a prevailing view that the
endogenous component of US monetary policy has changed substantially since 1960 and
its simulated results capture some important aspects of conventional wisdom about policy
changes from the 70’s through the 80’s to the 90’s.
Figure 3 shows the implied state-probabilities over time produced by this 4-state model.
We can see that state 1 has prevailed for most of our full sample period and for the entire
period from the late 80’s onward. We call this state the “Greenspan” state of policy, butREGIME SWITCHES 21
TABLE 7. Transition matrix for 4-state policy-only model
0.9627 0.0460 0.0203 0.0334
0.0214 0.9388 0.0195 0.0174
0.0077 0.0073 0.9414 0.0238
0.0082 0.0079 0.0188 0.9254
of course one needs to bear in mind that this policy regime was dominant in most of the
60’s and in the latter half of the 70’s as well. State 2 is the next most common, occur-
ing most frequently from the early 60’s through the early 70’s (the ﬁrst oil shock period),
though with no sustained periods of prevalence that match those of state 1. We call this the
“Burns” regime, even though it matches up with Burns’s chairmanship even less well than
the “Greenspan” regime matches with Greenspan’s. State 3 prevails during the Volcker
reserve targeting period and nowhere else except one very brief period around 1970. State
4 occurs only for a few isolated months, including 9/11, and seems clearly to be picking up
outliers rather than any systematic change of coefﬁcients.
The estimate of the transition matrix is shown in Table 7. The 4 states behave quite
differently. Nearly a half of the steady-state probability (0.49) goes to the Greenspan state.
For the other half, the probabilityis 0.25 for the Burns state, 0.143 for the Volckerstate, and
0.116 for the fourth state. From Table 7 one can also see that the probability of switching
from the Greenspan and Burns states to the Volcker and fourth states is reduced by one half
as compared to the probability of switching the other way.
Differences in the contemporaneous coefﬁcient matrix show up across states as well.
In Table 8 we can see that the Greenspan regime’s contemporaneous coefﬁcient matrix is
broadly similar to that estimated for the full sample with the variances-only model (Table
5). In particular, both policy rules show a much larger contemporaneous coefﬁcient on R
than onM. Onthe otherhand, we see fromTables 9 and 10that theBurns and Volckerstates
both have much larger contemporaneous coefﬁcients on M, with the M coefﬁcient being
relatively largest for the Volckerstate. These results are consistent with the observationthat

























































































FIGURE 3. State Probabilities, 4-state Monetary Policy Changing
In the background of each ﬁgure is the time path of the Fed Funds Rate.REGIME SWITCHES 23
TABLE 8. Contemporaneous coefﬁcient matrix for 1st state in 4-state
policy-only model
Financial M Policy M demand Private y Private P Private U
Pcom 68.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M 34.19 −208.60 −559.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
R −32.62 559.48 −172.64 0.00 −0.00 0.00
y −4.49 0.00 11.87 272.37 −17.51 51.94
P 8.65 0.00 −54.58 0.00 −1029.19 25.45
U 84.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 705.57
TABLE 9. Contemporaneous coefﬁcient matrix for 2nd state in 4-state
policy-only model
Financial M Policy M demand Private y Private P Private U
Pcom 38.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M 19.20 −221.50 −401.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
R −18.32 188.29 −123.97 0.00 −0.00 0.00
y −2.52 0.00 8.52 206.87 −13.72 42.40
P 4.86 0.00 −39.19 0.00 −806.18 20.77
U 47.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 576.00
attention to money growth (the interest rate) in the last few years of his tenure (Burns 1987
and Chappell and McGregor 2000) and that Greenspan made the interest rate the explicit
policy instrument.
The long run policy responses to macro variables show the similar pattern, as reported in
Table 11. The Greenspan regime shows slightly stronger point estimates of the responses
of the funds rate to money growth and inﬂation than those implied by the variances-onlyREGIME SWITCHES 24
TABLE 10. Contemporaneous coefﬁcient matrix for 3rd state in 4-state
policy-only model
Financial M Policy M demand Private y Private P Private U
Pcom 50.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M 25.35 −393.51 −241.46 0.00 0.00 0.00
R −24.18 136.05 −74.53 0.00 −0.00 0.00
y −3.33 0.00 5.12 235.35 −12.82 41.12
P 6.41 0.00 −23.56 0.00 −753.62 20.15
U 62.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 558.70
model (Table 6), but with greater uncertainty because of the smaller effective sample pe-
riod. For the Volckerand Burns regimes the responses of the federal funds rate are, variable
by variable, so ill-determined that we instead present responses of money growth, which
seems closer to the short-run policy target in those regimes. We see that the Volckerregime
makes money unresponsive to all variables (measured by both point estimates and error
bands). The Burns regime shows a disturbingly high responsiveness to inﬂation, though
the point estimate is still below 1, which is only partially offset by a negative response to
the rate of change in commodity prices.
Because the Burns regime looks like the most likely candidate for a potential sunspot
incubator, we tried normalizing that regime’s reaction function on the interest rate and
calculating its long-run response to the sum of the coefﬁcients on all nominal variables
— the rate of change in commodity prices, money growth, and inﬂation. This response
is surprisingly well-determined, probably because of collinearity in the sample among the
nominal variables.8 The 68% probabilityband is (.94,3.50), which makes it very likely that
the regime was not a sunspot incubator.
8Note that if we calculated long run responses of the interest rate for this regime, variable by variable, we
would get very large, opposite-signed numbers that wouldhave high uncertainty and be difﬁcult to interpret.REGIME SWITCHES 25
TABLE 11. Long run policy responses in 4-state policy-only model
First state (Greenspan)
Responses of R to Posterior peak estimate .68 probability interval
∆ Pcom 0.09 (-0.19, 0.24)
∆ M 0.23 (-0.46, 2.08)
∆ y 0.43 (-1.28, 0.64)
∆ P 1.99 (-0.09, 2.48)
U -1.29 (-0.91, 0.46)
Second state (Burns)
Responses of ∆ M to Posterior peak estimate .68 probability interval
∆ Pcom -0.24 (-0.50, 0.01)
R 0.09 (-0.02, 0.49)
∆ y 0.18 (-0.43, 0.35)
∆ P 0.92 (-0.17, 1.74)
U 0.05 (-0.025, 0.09)
Third state (Volcker)
Responses of ∆ M to Posterior peak estimate .68 probability interval
∆ Pcom -0.12 (-0.06, 0.05)
R 0.01 (-0.02, 0.20)
∆ y 0.13 (-0.70, 0.64)
∆ P 0.23 (-0.51, 0.28)
U 0.02 (-0.04, 0.06)
VI. HISTORICAL COUNTERFACTUALS
As a way to quantify the importance of policy change over time, the 4-state time-varying
model makes it an internally coherent exercise to calculate what would have happened if
regime changes had not occurred, or had occurred when they otherwise didn’t, at particular
historical dates. We have run quite a few of these experiments, but the main conclusionREGIME SWITCHES 26
is that the estimated policy changes do make a noticeable difference, but not a drastic
difference. In the following we display three examples that seem most relevant to the
debate on the effects of monetary policy changes.
VI.1. Replacing Volcker regime by Burns regime. Our estimated Burns regime, which
corresponds to only some years of Burns chairmanship when money growth was probably
playing some role in policy making, shows a fairly high responsiveness of money growth
to inﬂation in the estimated policy reaction function. It is therefore interesting to see what
would have happened to the economy had this regime prevailed in the early 80’s. To con-
duct this exercise, we hold the Burns regime in place through the entire period of Volcker
chairmanship. Our simulations account for uncertainty in the coefﬁcients of the estimated
Burns regime and uncertainty about the actual historical structural shocks. They keep the
unscaled shocks at their historical values (subject to the uncertainty), but scale them to
match the Burns regime variances. This makes sense for monetary policy shocks. If one
believed, as some policy makers do and the Lucas critique suggests, that private sector
shock variances responded to changes in the monetary policy rule, then our use of rescaled
private sector shocks would be appropriate. 9
We see from Figure 4 that as many would have expected, the Burns regime would not
have pushed interest rates so high, would have dampened the recession of the early 80’s —
possibly even to the point where it would not have registered as an ofﬁcial recession — and
wouldhave run a substantial risk ofletting inﬂationremainat 8% inthe late 80’s.10 The risk
of higher inﬂation, however, is ill-determined, given the wide error bands. Moreover, the
most likely path with the Burns regime, as often looked at in the literature, is remarkably
close to the historical path. The median outcome is estimated to be about one percentage
9The results we display here are not heavily dependent on shifts in private sector shock variances across
regimes. Ifwe replace theVolckerpolicy ruleby the Burnsreactionfunctionbutkeep privateshock variances
unchanged for this period, the estimated path and error bands are quite similar to Figure 4. One may think
that error bands shouldbe narrower if onlythe policy rule is replaced, but statisticallythe error bands may be
narrower or wider, depending on how the replaced policy reaction function interact with the coefﬁcients and
historical shocks in the rest of the system and how informative our normalization on labeling states is.












































































FIGURE 4. Counterfactuals: Burns regime through the 80’s
Each graph shows the historicalpath (blackest), the median counterfactual path, and 68% and 90%
probabilitybands.REGIME SWITCHES 28
pointhigherthan historicalinﬂationat theend ofthe 80’s, whilehaving keptunemployment
one to two percentage points lower during a long stretch of the early 80’s. It is not so
obvious that this is terrible monetary policy. The reason the most likely counterfactualpath
of inﬂation shows a steady decline from about 9% to 5% is partly due to the result that the
response of the interest rate to all nominal variables under the Burns regime is well above
1.0 with about 84% probability. Money plays an indispensable role so that any structural
model should include the money stock to study the policy rule for this historical period.
VI.2. Replacing Volcker regime by Greenspan regime. Towards the end of the 70’s, in-
ﬂation began to gain momentum to rise again. Burns himself recognized the public and
political pressure to do something drastic that differed from the previous policy.11 He spec-
ulated as to whether central bankers, “having by now become accustomed to gradualism,
would be willing to risk the painful economic adjustments that I fear are ultimately un-
avoidable” (Burns 1987), but he himself was by then apparently willing to risk it.
But was the drastic change to the reserve-targeting policy adopted by Volcker from 1979
to 1982 in fact necessary to bring down the rapidly rising inﬂation? After all, Burns’s
speech, after he left ofﬁce, suggests that he himself would have made sharply restrictive
moves had he stayed in ofﬁce, and it is his behavior that the model allocates to the Burns
regime. One way to answer this question is to rerun economic history, replacing the 1979-
1982 Volcker regime with the Greenspan regime, which used an interest rate instrument
and smoothed interest rates, thereby being perhaps more “gradualist” than Volcker during
1979-82. We hold the Greenspan regime in place through the entire period of Volcker
chairmanship until 1987:7. Would this change in policy have greatly affected outcomes?
Would inﬂation have taken much longer to end?
The simulated results are reported in Figure 5. The counterfactual funds rate path is
much smoother than both actual data and the counterfactual path with the Burns regime
11Inhis30September 1979speech (Burns1987),Burnsadmitted: “IntheUnitedStatesa greatmajorityof
the public now regard inﬂationas the Number One problem facing the country, and this judgmentis accepted
by both the Congress and the Executive Branch. ... In view of the strong and widespread expectations of
inﬂation that prevail at present, I have therefore reluctantly come to believe that fairly drastic therapy will be
needed to turn inﬂationary psychologyaround.”REGIME SWITCHES 29
























































FIGURE 5. Counterfactuals: Greenspan regime through the 80’s
Each graph shows the historicalpath (blackest), the median counterfactual path, and 68% and 90%
probabilitybands.
in Figure 4: the funds rate would have been much lower from late 1979 to the end of
1982 (measured by both the median path and error bands) and the most likely path would
have remained lower after 1982. The wide error band for the counterfactual path of money
growth is consistent with the less attention paid to money in the estimated policy rule under
the Greenspan regime. The counterfactualinﬂation path wouldhave come down as steadilyREGIME SWITCHES 30
as actual data with the most likely path about one percentage point lower than the histor-
ical, while the median path of unemployment would have been kept about one percentage
point lower through the entire period. There would have been no tradeoff between the in-
ﬂation decline and the output loss. The most likely counterfactual path of output growth
would have been much smoother and the error bands imply the strong likelihood that both
recessions would not have been as deep as what actually occured.
These results do not contradict some economists’ view that Volcker’s “harsh” stabiliza-
tion policy might have been only politically, not economically, necessary. As Bryant (page
107, 1983) put it, “the policy goal of reducing inﬂation was pursued too zealously in 1980–
82 in the United States without sufﬁcient regard for the probable costs in unemployment
and lost output.”
VI.3. Greenspan regime in place throughout73-79. The two rapid rises in inﬂation dur-
ing the 70’s have often been attributed to Burns’s stop-go monetary policy. Indeed, our
4-state model’s dynamics show no sustained regime during Burns’s tenure. Our estimated
monetary policy switches frequently between two regimes, with policy reacting more to
money growth in one rule than the other.12
To quantify the effect of a different policy behavior, we re-examine the historical period
1973:1 – 1979:9 when the ﬁrst upward swing of inﬂation was about to start at the beginning
of 1973, and hold the Greenspan regime in place throughoutthis period. The counterfactual
paths are reported in Figure 6. Since the Burns regime was actually in place for the early
part of this period, replacing it by the Greenspan regime did produce different outcomes:
inﬂation would not have been pushed as high as the ﬁrst run-up in 1975, the interest rate
would have been smoothed somewhat, and money growth would have been lowered in the
later part of the period. The biggest difference shows up in the counterfactual paths for
12Burns (1987) acknowledged: “Partly as a result of the chronic inﬂation of our times, central bankers
have been giving closer attention to the money supply than did their predecessors; but they continue to be
seriously concerned with the behavior of interest rates.” The records from the Memoranda of Discussion
from 1970:2 to 1976:3 and FOMC transcripts in 1976–1978 suggest that the FOMC during the 70’s seemed
frequently to grapple with the question of whether monetary aggregates or interest rates should be used as a
primary policy instrument.REGIME SWITCHES 31
output growth and unemployment: a shallower recession in the early 70’s with unemploy-
ment two percentage points lower in 1975, slower output growth in the later period, and a
modest payoff in lower inﬂation at the end of the 70’s.
Clearly, the inﬂation path with the Greenspan regime would have nonetheless resulted
in a rise in inﬂation in the early 70’s, albeit less steep than what actually occurred. The
most likely counterfactual path of inﬂation at the end of the 70’s shows no tendency to
drift upward but there is great uncertainty surrounding this path. Had the Greenspan policy
rule been placed in the 70’s, the outcome would have been better, but the differences are
probably not as large as commonly thought.
VII. CONCLUSION
Monetary policy and its history are complex, and abstract theoretical models that we use
to organize thought about them can hide what was really going on. Explorations of data
with relatively few preconceptions, like this exploration, may bring out regularities that
have been slipping through abstract discussion. In this case, we think this has happened.
Our best-ﬁt model suggests that time-varying shock variances are the most important
instability in the time series of ﬁve key US macro variables. Even with the four-state
model, which assumes the existence of regime changes in monetary policy, our various
point estimates imply that the impact on the economy of changes in the systematic part of
monetary policy are modest.
Policy actions were difﬁcult to predict, and if there were shifts in the systematic com-
ponent of policy, they are of a sort that it is difﬁcult for us to track precisely even with
hindsight. The truth seems to be that if there were important nonlinear elements of policy
behavior in this period, thinking of them as easily detectable regime shifts is mistake.
The role of monetarism in conditioning policy responses seems to have been more im-
portant than is allowed for in most currently fashionable theories.
APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE MODEL WITH CGG IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS
Here we display a standard simple New Keynesian model. The model has a unique






































































FIGURE 6. Counterfactuals: Greenspan regime through the 70’s
Each graph shows the historicalpath (blackest), the median counterfactual path, and 68% and 90%
probabilitybands.REGIME SWITCHES 33
The model is written in terms of the interest rate r, logarithmic deviation from steady
state of output y, and inﬂation π . Its equations are
M policy: rt = α 0π t−1+α 1yt−1+α 2rt−1+ε t (A1)
IS: Etyt+1 = yt +γ (rt −Et[π t+1]+logβ )+ξ t (A2)
Phillips curve: π t = θ 0Et[π t+1]+θ 1Et[yt+1]+ω t (A3)
(A4)
With reasonable parameter values13, this model’s solution implies that inﬂation is serially
uncorrelated, that other variables follow MA(2) processes, and that there is a single state
variable (the linear combination of lagged variables appearing on the right-hand-sideof the
monetary policy equation). The policy rule implies a strong long-run response of interest
rates to any sustained increase in inﬂation (which of course does not occur in equilibrium),
so there is no problem with existence or uniqueness of a solution.
Any attempt to estimate a purelyforward-lookingTaylor rule fromdata generated by this
economy by instrumental variables methods would fail. Because of the one-dimensional
state, there is really only one instrument available for the two expected future values on the
right-hand-side of a forward-looking Taylor rule. Indeed, if twice-lagged variables were
used as instruments, they would have no correlation at all with the variables they were
instrumenting for. As is well known, in this weak-instrument situation, results might easily
nonetheless appear to be signiﬁcant.
While this result is extreme, resulting from the simplicity of the model, it illustrate prob-
lems that will be present in any model. If policy succeeds in keeping inﬂation low and
stable, it will make variation in expected future inﬂation small, and may easily make high
current nominal rates predict low, not high, future inﬂation. This is likely to make IV re-
sults erratic, as well as necessarily misleading when the Taylor rule is not in fact forward-
looking.
Furthermore,ifwe expanded this model, say by adding morelags on the right-hand-sides
of the ﬁrst and third equations, so that IV methods are at least possible, they would estimate
13For example, α 0 = .3, α 1 = .4, α 2 = .8, γ = 2, θ 0 = .9, θ 1 = .3.REGIME SWITCHES 34
the IS equation, not the policy rule. Ifthe second (IS)equation is renormalized to have rt on
the left, it relates current r to expected future inﬂation, expected future output growth, and
a shock. Since this is the same form as the forward-looking Taylor rule, and the equation
is distinguished from the other two by the identifying assumptions, IV methods to estimate
such an equation would reproduce the IS curve, normalized on rt as left-hand side variable.
This would of course give a coefﬁcient on expected future inﬂation of approximately one,
implying a high probability, given the data, of values less than one. But this would not
indicate any problem with existence or uniqueness of equilibrium.
APPENDIX B. ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE
B.1. The Prior. The identiﬁcation speciﬁed in Table 1 is a special case of standard linear






































where bj and gj are the free parameters “squeezed” out of a j and dj by the linear restric-
tions, oj and rj are the numbers of the corresponding free parameters, columns of U j are
orthonormalvectors in the Euclidean space Rnh, and columns ofVj are orthonormalvectors
in Rmh.




For all the models studied in this paper, we set H0j and H+j the same way as Sims
and Zha 1998a but scale them by the number of states (h) so that the Case I model inREGIME SWITCHES 35
(8) coincides with the standard Bayesian VAR with constant parameters. The liquidity
effect prior is implemented by adjusting the off-diagonal elements of H0j that correspond
to the coefﬁcients of M and R for j = 2,3 such that the correlation for the policy equation
(the second equation) is -0.8 and the correlation for the money demand equation (the third
equation) is 0.8. Because we use monthly data, the tightness of the reference prior is set
as, in the notation of Sims and Zha 1998a, λ 0 = 0.6,λ 1 = 0.1,λ 2 = 1.0,λ 3 = 1.2,λ 4 =
0.1,µ5 = 5.0, and µ6 = 5.0 (see Robertson and Tallman 2001).
The priordistributionforξ j(k)is taken as π (ζ j(k))=Γ (α ζ ,β ζ )fork ∈{1,...,h}, where
ζ j(k) ≡ ξ 2
j (k) and Γ (·) denotes the standard gamma pdf with β ζ being a scale factor (not
an inverse scale factor as in the notation of some textbooks). The prior pdf for λ ij(k) is
N(0,σ 2
λ ) for k ∈{ 1,...,h}.
The prior of the transition matrix P takes a Dirichlet form as suggested by Chib 1996.
For the kth column of P, pk, the prior density is





where α ik > 0 for i = 1,...,h.
The hyperparameters α ζ , β ζ , and σ λ are newly introduced and have no reference values
in the literature. We set α ζ = β ζ = 1 and σ λ = 50 as the benchmark and then perform a
sensitivity check by varying these values. The prior setting σ λ = 50 is reasonable because
the posterior estimate of λ ij(k) can be as large as 40 or 50 even with a much smaller value
of σ λ .14
There are two steps in setting up a prior for pk. First, the prior mode of pik is chosen to
be υ ik such that υ kk = 0.95 and υ ik = 0.05/(h−1) for i  = k. Note that ∑
h
i=1υ ik = 1. In the
second step, given υ ik and
 
Var(pkk) (which is set to 0.025), we solve for α kk through a
third polynomial and then for all other elements of the vector α k through a system of h−1
linear equations. This prior expresses the belief that the average duration of each state is
about 20 months. We also experienced with different prior values for P, including a very
diffuse prior for P by letting υ ik be evenly distributed across i for given k and by letting the
14Indeed, a tighterprior on λ ij(k) tends to lower the marginal likelihoodfor the same model.REGIME SWITCHES 36
prior standard deviation of pik be much larger than 0.025. The results seem insensitive to
these prior values.
B.2. Posterior Estimate. We gather different groups of free parameters as follows, with
the understanding that we sometimes interchange the use of free parameters and original
(but restricted) parameters.







ζ j(k), j = 1,...,n, k = 1,...,h
 
, for Case II;
λ =
 
λ ij(k), i, j = 1,...,n, k = 1,...,h
 
, for Case III;
g =
 





bj, j = 1,...,n
 
;
θ = {p,γ ,g,b}.
The overall likelihoodfunction π (YT |θ )can be obtained by integrating over unobserved
states the conditional likelihood at each time t and by recursively multiplying these condi-
tional likelihood functions forward (Kim and Nelson 1999).
From the Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of θ conditional on the data is
π (θ |YT) ∝ π (θ )π (YT | θ ),
where the prior π (θ ) is speciﬁed in Section B.1.
In order to avoid very long startup periods for the MCMC sampler, it is important to
begin with at least an approximate estimate of the peak of the posterior density π (θ |
YT). Moreover, such an estimate is used as a reference point in normalization to obtain
likelihood-based statistical inferences. Because the number of parameters is quite large for
our models (over500), we used an eclectic approach, combiningthe stochastic expectation-
maximizing algorithm with various optimization routines. For some models, the conver-
gence took as many as 15 hours on an Intel Pentium 4 2.0GHz PC. 15
15We are still improvingour algorithm. Once it is ﬁnished, it is possible that the computing time could be
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B.3. Inference. Our objective is to obtain the posterior distribution of functions of θ such
as impulse responses, forecasts, historical decompositions, and long-run responses of pol-
icy. It involves integrating over large dimensions many highly nonlinear functions. We fol-
low Sims and Zha 2004 to use a Gibbs sampler to obtain the joint distribution π (θ ,ST |YT)
where ST = {s0,s1,...,sT}. The Gibbs sampler involves sampling alternatively from the
following conditional posterior distributions:
Pr(ST |YT, p,γ ,g,b),
π (p |YT,ST,γ ,g,b),
π (γ |YT,ST, p,g,b),
π (g |YT,ST, p,γ ,b),
π (b |YT,ST, p,γ ,g).
It has been shown in the literature that such a Gibbs sampling procedure produces the
uniquelimitingdistributionthatisthe posteriordistributionofST and θ (e.g., Geweke1999).
The probability density functions of these conditional distributions are quite complicated
but can be nonetheless simulated from (for details, see Sims and Zha 2004).
B.4. Normalization. To obtain accurate posterior distributions of functions of θ (such as
long run responses and historical decompositions), we must normalize both the signs of
structural equations and the labels of states; otherwise, the posterior distributions will be
symmetricwith multiplemodes, making statistical inferencesof interestmeaningless. Such
normalization is also necessary to achieve efﬁciency in evaluating the marginal likelihood
for model comparison.16 For both purposes, we normalize the signs of structural equations
the same way. Speciﬁcally, we use the Waggoner and Zha (2003) normalization rule to
determine the column signs of A0(k) and A+(k) for any given k ∈{ 1,...,h}.
Two additional normalizations are (1) scale normalization on ζ j(k) and λ j(k) and (2)
label normalization on the states. We simulate MCMC posterior draws of θ with ζ j(k)=1
and λ j(k)=1h×1 for all j ∈{1,...,n}, and k ∈{1,...,h}, where the notation 1h×1 denotes
16Note that the marginal data density is invariant to the way parameters are normalized, as long as the
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the h×1 vector of 1’s. For each posterior draw, we label the states so that the posterior
probabilities of each state for all t ∈{ 1,...,T} match closest to the posterior estimates of
those probabilities.17
To estimate the marginal data density π (YT) for each model, we apply both the modiﬁed
harmonic mean method (MHM) of Gelfand and Dey 1994 and the method of Chib and
Jeliazkov 2001. The MHM method is quite efﬁcient for most models considered in this
paper, but it may give unreliable estimates for some models whose posterior distributions
have multiple modes. In such a situation, we also use the Chib and Jeliazkov to check the
robustness of the estimate.
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